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European Goods Market Integration in 
the Very Long Run: From the Black Death 
to the First World War
Giovanni Federico, Max-Stephan Schulze, and oliver volckart
This paper examines price convergence and changes in the efficiency of wheat 
markets, covering the period from the mid-fourteenth to the early twentieth 
century and most of Europe. The analysis is based on a new data set of prices 
from almost 600 markets. Unlike previous research, we find that convergence 
was a predominantly pre-modern phenomenon. It started in the late fifteenth 
century, advanced rapidly until the beginning of the seventeenth century when 
it temporarily stalled, resumed after the Thirty Years’ War, and accelerated after 
the Napoleonic Wars in response to trade liberalization. From the late 1840s, 
convergence petered out and turned into divergence after 1875 as policy decisions 
dominated technological change. Our results point to the ‘Little Divergence’ 
between North-Western Europe and the rest of the continent as starting about 
1600. Long-term improvements in market efficiency began in the early sixteenth 
century, with advances over time being as uneven as in price convergence. We 
trace this to differential institutional change and the non-synchronous spread of 
modern media and systems of information transmission that affected the ability of 
merchants to react to news.
Economic historians have always regarded the expansion of markets and the resulting increase in the division of labor and specialization 
as powerful sources of growth, especially in pre-industrial Europe (Kelly 
1997; Epstein 2000; Malanima 2009; Persson 2010; Chilosi et al. 2013; 
for dissenting voices, see Clark 2007; Bateman 2012; van Bavel 2016). 
Some have also argued that the development of better integrated markets 
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in England and the Dutch Republic since the seventeenth century contrib-
uted crucially to the Little Divergence between these countries and the 
rest of Europe (Allen 2001; Fouquet and Broadberry 2015). Market inte-
gration, thus, has been placed squarely at the center of the economic 
development of Europe. Whether it deserves this place is difficult to test. 
Historians have spent decades investigating qualitative sources, such as 
legal codes or contracts concluded between merchants (evidence that is 
difficult to quantify), to examine the development of trade and markets. 
Even when they used sources that contained quantitative data (e.g., 
merchant books of account), they rarely collected and analyzed them 
econometrically. We, therefore, know far less about the quantitative than 
the qualitative aspects of European commerce.1
This is why economic historians have increasingly turned to price 
data. Wheat prices especially are among the best quantitative evidence 
available: they are abundant and, given the fairly homogenous nature of 
wheat, relatively easy to standardize. Spreads between prices in different 
locations persistently above the commodity points (i.e., the trade costs, 
possibly adjusted for arbitrage risk) would suggest that merchants left 
opportunities for arbitrage unexploited and, therefore, that trade would 
be less intensive than otherwise possible. Moreover, where prices on 
different markets moved in step, this was probably the result of merchants 
using the same information to make decisions about buying and selling 
commodities. Hence, analyzing price differentials systematically helps 
compensate for the lack of evidence on actual trade flows.
Historians broadly agree on nineteenth- and twentieth-century trends 
in trade identified in this way. By contrast, a consensus on when, how 
far, and how quickly markets integrated across Europe and over the very 
long term, let alone about why they did so, is still lacking. In particular, 
findings on the timing of pre-modern integration differ widely—unsur-
prisingly so, given that research has so far failed to agree on a number of 
central methodological points. There is neither a consistent and precise 
definition of integration nor agreement on what measures of integration 
to use (Fackler and Goodwin 2001, pp. 976–81). Moreover, the results 
of empirical work are hard to compare because scholars have focused on 
different product markets, regions, and time periods and used different 
econometric techniques (Federico 2012a).
1 From the late Middle Ages onward, a growing number of customs registers have been 
preserved, some of which have been examined in this context (cf. Carus-Wilson and Coleman, 
1963). The most comprehensive are the Sound-Toll-Registers (cf. Christiansen 1934; http://www.
soundtoll.nl/index.php/en/over-het-project/str-online) that cover the years from 1497 to 1857.
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This paper builds on an extensive new wheat price data set that covers 
far more markets, a wider geographical area (most of Europe), and a 
longer period of time (from the Black Death to the First World War) 
than any previous analyses.2 The focus of the paper is on measuring and 
documenting wheat market integration in Europe. We study two dimen-
sions of integration: price convergence, a decrease in price differentials 
between markets, and improvements in market efficiency. “Semi-strong 
efficiency” is taken to refer to the extent to which prices reflect publicly 
available and relevant information. In an “efficient” market, there are no 
opportunities left for arbitrage. The market integration literature typically 
proceeds from the assumption that agents know prices and conditions 
in their own as well as other locations. If a shock causes price differ-
entials within well-integrated markets to diverge from their equilibrium 
level, arbitrage would restore the equilibrium price gap. The faster this 
process, the more efficient is the market (Federico 2012a, 2019). Price 
convergence and adjustment to shocks do not necessarily move in step. 
They require separate analyses with different statistical techniques and 
may give rise to different views of historical integration processes. We 
address two core questions: First, when and by how much did wheat 
prices converge? Second, to what extent, if any, did markets become 
more efficient over time?
In contrast to previous work in the field, we find that price convergence 
in Europe was a long-term process that began in the mid-fifteenth and 
continued (with accelerations and setbacks) to the mid-nineteenth century. 
We also find that convergence was associated with an improvement in 
market efficiency, approximated by co-movements in prices, from the 
early sixteenth century onward (likewise with temporary setbacks). The 
paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the recent literature 
on long-run market integration in Europe. We then set out the intuition 
of our approach and empirical strategy in the second section. The third 
section describes the extensive new data set, while the fourth section 
discusses the main results on price convergence and co-movement. The 
fifth section compares the timing of these two dimensions of integration 
and suggests some hypotheses to account for the similarities and differ-
ences observed. This section emphasizes the role of conflicts and better 
communications such as the development of postal networks and news-
papers. The conclusion draws attention to the main implications of the 
new results.
2 Froot, Kim, and Rogoff (1995) examine a similar span of time but analyze integration between 
England and the Netherlands only. Chilosi et al. (2013) and Studer (2015) cover the period from 
the early seventeenth to the late nineteenth centuries only. 
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LITERATURE SURVEY
The statistical analysis of market integration dates back to the 1950s 
(Achilles 1959), but research in this field has come into its own only 
since about the turn of the last century. While about half of the studies 
published between 2009 and 2012 concern the modern world (Federico 
2012a), it is striking that market integration is one of the few topics where 
quantitative methods have made major inroads into research on pre-
modern economic history. This has been possible because of the extensive 
preservation of price data from the pre-statistical age. However, most of 
these studies focus on short periods, especially those on the eighteenth 
century, and on individual European countries such as France (Tilly 1971; 
Chevet and Saint Amour 1991; Roehner 1994; Chevet 1996, O’Grada and 
Chevet 2002). The few long-term, Europe-wide papers agree neither on 
the timing nor the pace of integration. The pioneering work by Achilles 
(1959) identifies increasing integration all over Europe from 1550 to 
1700, while Allen and Unger (1990) and Persson (1999) find an emerging 
integrated European wheat market in the eighteenth century. On the other 
hand, van Bochove (2007) and Özmucur and Pamuk (2007) rule out any 
such integration from the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Area studies, too, yield mixed results. For instance, Jacks (2004) 
finds no clear trends in the Baltic before 1640, disintegration in 1640–
1670, and re-integration in the eighteenth century. The most recent studies 
do not settle the issue. Chilosi et al. (2013) and Studer (2015) focus on 
the period from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth or early twentieth 
century. They observe a trend toward price convergence in the early 
modern period, especially from the late seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth 
century. Their measure of efficiency (i.e., the co-movement of prices 
across markets), though, remains almost constant until the late eighteenth 
century. Drawing on a smaller number of markets, Bateman (2011, 2012) 
estimates 50-year averages of price gaps since 1400. Bateman’s averages 
remained large until 1500 and thereafter moved erratically: they declined 
in 1500–1549, increased in 1550–1600, declined again in 1600–1649, 
rebounded in 1650–1700, hit a trough in 1700–1749, and increased again 
in the second half of the eighteenth century. Contradicting most other 
studies (Jacks 2005; Federico and Persson 2007; Federico 2011; Chilosi 
et al. 2013), Bateman argues that price gaps remained large in the first 
half of the nineteenth century and collapsed only between 1849 and 1900 
(Bateman 2012). These conflicting results reflect the use of different data 
sets covering different markets and periods. Most works rely on small 
samples whose composition changes over time. For instance, Bateman 
(2011) quotes price series from 46 markets, but many of them have 
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extensive gaps in observations.3 Chilosi et al. (2013) find a substantial 
difference in dispersion of prices between a balanced sample of 13 markets 
and a wider unbalanced sample of about 60 markets in the nineteenth 
century. Though following by and large similar trends, the coefficient of 
variation of their balanced sample was consistently smaller than that of 
the unbalanced sample. Sample composition evidently matters.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Mapping price convergence is fairly uncontroversial. A standard 
measure is the coefficient of variation, which gives the dispersion of 
prices across markets in a given year. It is easy to compute and compa-
rable across time and space for the same product and allows compari-
sons of convergence patterns between different products. Moreover, it is 
reasonably robust to quality differentials for fairly homogenous products 
such as wheat. Ideally, prices should refer to the same quality, but biases 
from quality differentials and from their changes in time are not system-
atic and they may well cancel out each other (Federico 2011).4
Selecting a measure of efficiency is less straightforward. The basic 
idea is to examine to what extent and how quickly prices across localities 
re-adjusted after shocks such as crop failures, wars, or the conclusion of 
trade treaties. Efficiency is, thus, indicated by the extent to which prices on 
several markets move in line with each other. The reaction to price shocks 
can be estimated with different versions of autoregressive models for pairs 
of markets (Federico 2012a, 2019). However, results are meaningful only 
if the frequency of the series (say, in months) is higher than the expected 
3 Bateman estimates price gaps with a fixed-effect panel regression, with relative prices 
between pairs of markets as the dependent variable, explained by time dummies. She computes 
price gaps between all markets of a “country” (in late nineteenth-century borders) and markets 
in the rest of Europe and then obtains the European gap as a mean of country-specific gaps. 
For instance, her “Italy” includes Tuscany (1263–1859—itself a composite series of prices in 
Pisa and Florence), Naples (1474–1893), Sansepolcro (1500–1631), Catania (1512–1630), Udine 
(1600–1825), Milan (1700–1860), Ancona (1700–1825), and Pesaro (1700–1825). These markets 
belonged to the same polity only after 1860.
4 The coefficient of variation would be biased upward if the difference between the available 
price and the “true,” quality-adjusted one is positive (i.e., the quality of the quoted wheat is better 
than the “reference” one) in high-price markets or if it is negative in low-price markets. The 
coefficient would be biased downward in the opposite case but only if the difference in quality-
adjusted prices exceeds in absolute value the quality gap. Therefore, the coefficient of variation 
is more likely to be upward than downward biased. This bias would be smaller the greater the 
differences in quality-adjusted price differentials are relative to quality differentials. This implies 
that quality differentials are a problem, especially in highly integrated markets. An improvement 
in quality of wheat traded relative to the reference ones would bias upward the coefficient of 
variation in high price markets, but it would bias it downward in low price ones. The effect of a 
worsening of relative quality would be the opposite, and the net effect is unpredictable.
Federico, Schulze, and Volckart6
reaction time (Taylor 2001; Brunt and Cannon 2014) and if there is trade 
between markets. For most historical cases, the evidence on trade flows 
and time of adjustment is too scarce to assess either condition. It is, though, 
unlikely that prices took more than a year to adjust and, thus, autoregres-
sive models with annual data would yield biased results. For this reason, 
we rather approximate market efficiency by its outcome, that is, by the 
degree of co-movement in prices. The more efficient a market, the less 
likely are permanent equilibrium price differentials between different loca-
tions. The previous literature focused on co-movements between pairs of 
markets (Federico 2012a). Here, we consider co-movements between all 
price series drawing on dynamic factor analysis (DFA). In a nutshell, it is a 
dynamic version of principal component analysis. DFA allows extracting 
endogenously the common shocks affecting any number of price series and 
measures the degree of co-movement between this common component 
and local market-specific shocks (Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman 2003). In 
effect, the technique permits deriving a synthetic sample-wide “price” in 
relation to which we can assess the adjustment of local markets.
More formally, we decompose the residual from (Hodrick–Prescott) 
filtered series of prices HPit:
5
           HPit = λict + uit,              (1)
where ct is the shock common to all price series at time t, λi (“loading”) 
is a time-invariant feature of the ith market, and uit represents the time-
varying and market-specific residuals. The expression λict measures the 
contribution of common shocks to market-specific shocks in year t. Thus, 
the degree of co-movement between each market and the common compo-
nent (or factor) over the entire period of estimation can be measured by 
the share in total variance:
                  τi = λi
2 × var(ct)/var(HPit).         (2)
A sample-wide (synthetic) measure of efficiency Ti can be obtained as 
an average of market-specific ratios τi. We set the few cases of negative 
loading (λi < 0) to zero. They correspond to a negative correlation with 
the common factor, but they yield a positive τ and, thus, including them 
would overstate the degree of co-movement.6
5 We follow Ravn and Uhlig’s (2002) recommendation and use a smoothing parameter of 6.25 
for annual data, which is close to the value of 10 suggested by Baxter and King (1999).
6 In principle, one could estimate a DFA model with several common components—for 
example, by adding a national or regional component to the overall, that is, sample-wide, 
component (Uebele 2011). However, given changes in political geography, grouping markets 
according to political boundaries would be historically problematic. More importantly, this 
would distract from the focus on market integration across Europe. Hence, we consider only one 
common component and run the DFA model over rolling windows.
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DATA
The new wheat price data set includes more than 68,000 price observa-
tions from more than 580 locations for 1348–1913, thus going far beyond 
what earlier studies were able to exploit (Federico, Schulze, and Volckart 
2020). It covers almost the entire continent from Portugal to Russia, 
though most of the markets cluster in the territories of modern Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands (Map 1).
The data have been collected from a wide range of sources and we 
have benefited particularly from the late eighteenth-century interest in 
grain prices. Many journals and monographs appearing in the context of 
the Enlightenment did not only contain extensive discussions of grain 
price formation—Unger (1752) is a well-known example—but also 
published price series that in some cases stretch back for centuries (e.g., 
Anonymous 1765; Wüllen 1771; Brüggemann 1800). Much of this mate-
rial has not been used by economic historians before.
Almost all historical sources report only one price of “wheat” for each 
location and the few other sources distinguish at best different prove-
nances (e.g., “domestic” versus “Baltic” in Amsterdam).7 Note that it was 
Map 1
TOTAL SAMPLE: ALL MARKETS
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration. Underlying map: Esri. “World Light Grey Base” [basemap]. 
Scale Not Given. January 31, 2015. 
7 In the small number of cases in which prices of different qualities or types of wheat are listed 
for a particular market (e.g., Emden and Nordhausen in Germany), we took the average.
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not before the late nineteenth century that standardized quality grading 
was introduced and prices began to refer to specific grain grades (Velkar 
2010, pp. 23–24). Differences in quality across markets and changes over 
time can potentially affect our measure of price dispersion. However, 
as set out above, any resulting biases are undetermined over the long 
run, are not necessarily systematic, and can cancel out (see the Empirical 
Strategy section).
All prices are converted to grams of silver per hectoliter.8 For the 
period before the establishment of the international gold standard in the 
1870s, conversions are based on the pure silver content of the coinage 
used locally. We use the content of the largest denomination, as people 
typically did not use small change to buy grain. Changes in the pure silver 
content of currencies through debasements and (rarer) reinforcement 
were fully taken into account. For the post-1870 gold standard period, 
using the pure silver content of the coinage would not have made much 
sense. Here, we draw on exchange rates between the local currency and 
the Pound sterling in combination with London silver prices. All prices 
have been aggregated at the level of calendar years if they were origi-
nally recorded in a frequency or applied to harvest years; they are, thus, 
comparable in the cross section and over time.9
The number of available price series increases over time, reaching 
a maximum of 300 different markets in the eighteenth century. Inter-
temporal changes in the geographical coverage, i.e., sample composition, 
would likely bias the results of any analysis that draws on all series in 
the data set (“unbalanced sample”). In the interest of consistency and as 
a means of avoiding these biases, we constructed different “balanced” 
samples, each including a constant set of markets over time. The analysis 
relies on a long-run balanced sample of 15 markets for 1450–1913 (Map 
2) and a larger balanced sample of 31 markets that covers the period 
1508–1785 (Map 3). A further set of seven overlapping period-specific 
balanced samples for 80-year periods is designed to maximize the 
8 This follows standard practice in the literature for want of an obvious alternative. The 
simplifying assumption is that silver markets were reasonably well integrated. In the given 
context, this assumption seems justifiable as the weight-value ratio of bullion was more favorable 
than for any other goods, suggesting that, in all likelihood, bullion markets were better integrated 
than others (Chilosi and Volckart 2011).
9 Most of our sources report calendar year prices. This is in line with Gerhard and Kaufhold’s 
(1990, pp. 6–7) observations on pre-modern recording practice. In the far fewer cases of monthly 
or quarterly price data, we used annual averages. Where data were reported for harvest years, 
we assumed that the typical harvest took place in August and computed weighted calendar year 
averages. Albers, Pfister, and Uebele (2018, pp. 62–82) offer a detailed econometric treatment of 
the issue with respect to German prices.
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number of markets represented.10 In order to ensure as even as possible 
geographical coverage in the seven samples, we first superimposed a grid 
of 100 by 100 kilometer cells onto the European map. In the next step, we 
checked whether any cell contained more than one market; wherever that 
was the case, we retained that market whose distance to markets in neigh-
boring grid cells is largest. The procedure serves to minimize over- or 
under-representation of regions. Its advantage is that it does not impose 
a priori segmentation into periods assumed to be historically significant. 
It also avoids geographical clustering of markets along political borders, 
Map 2
LONG-RUN BALANCED SAMPLE: 15 MARKETS
Note: The dotted line defines the area covered in the construction of a subset of markets from the 
period-specific samples (see the Results: Convergence and Co-Movement section).
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration. Underlying map: Esri. “World Light Grey Base” [basemap]. 
Scale Not Given. January 31, 2015
10 See Online Appendix Table A.1 for a list of markets. Note that only markets with at least 95 
percent of observations available for the relevant time period have been selected for the sample. 
We interpolate the missing data (up to a maximum of 5 percent) with a TRAMO routine (cf. 
Gómez and Maravall 1996). The choice of 80-year samples is a pragmatic compromise, reflecting 
the desire to maximize the number of markets with unbroken price series and the need to work 
with periods of a length sufficient to derive historically meaningful results.
Federico, Schulze, and Volckart10
which changed frequently in our period. Note that especially from the 
sixteenth century onward, the samples show a strong overlap in terms of 
the markets represented (Table 1). This facilitates the interpretation of 
the results of our analyses from a long-term perspective.
RESULTS: CONVERGENCE AND CO-MOVEMENT
As a first cut, Figure 1 documents the coefficient of variation for all 
the markets (unbalanced sample), including a polynomial trend for ease 
of exposition. Notwithstanding pronounced fluctuations in the short and 
medium term, the data suggest a long-run trend fall in price dispersion 
from, broadly, the first half of the fifteenth through to the early twentieth 
century. Note, though, there were significant—if temporary—reversals, 
especially in the early sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as well 
as during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. From about 
1850, price differentials remained more or less stable.
Figure 2 compares the pattern of convergence from 1450 onward 
according to the unbalanced and the long-run balanced sample. The latter 
always includes the same 15 markets. The overall picture of a long-run 
decline in price dispersion is broadly similar in both samples. However, 
there are striking differences in detail and timing: Despite some pronounced 
variation, price differentials within the balanced sample declined from a 
peak at the end of the fifteenth to a trough at the beginning of the seven-
teenth century. For the remainder of the early modern period, convergence 
table 1





















Sample Size 15 13 32 52 88 116 84 102 31
1430–1509 9 — 9 8 9 11 10 7
1508–1587 11 — — 23 22 24 17 13 23
1581–1660 12 — — — 44 44 29 18 28
1644–1723 13 — — — — 75 46 31 29
1706–1785 15 — — — — — 60 36 30
1772–1851 13 — — — — — — 45 22
1834–1913 9 — — — — — — — 14
Source:
AU: Please add Source.
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among the 15 markets did not progress beyond what had been achieved 
earlier on. The minimum of dispersion was reached in the 1870s, with the 
decades thereafter seeing a major rollback in price convergence.
How valid is the impression gained from the development of the coef-
ficient of variation of the balanced sample? We explore trend and level 
breaks more formally, using a Bai–Perron (2003) test. The results point 
to breaks in 1599, 1649, 1799, 1842, and 1875, yielding six periods. For 
each of these periods, linear trends have been estimated with an error 
correction model (Razzaque et al. 2007):
Δ ln(CVt) = c + β TIME + ψ ln(CVt–1) + φ Δ ln(CVt–1) + ut, (3)
where TIME tests for the existence of a deterministic trend: prices converge 
if β is negative and significant. The coefficient ψ on the error correction 
term, which is expected to range between –1 and 0, measures the speed 
of return to this trend: the higher ψ is, the faster is the return to trend. The 







































































LONG-RUN PRICE CONVERGENCE—COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION,  
UNBALANCED SAMPLE
Source: See the text.
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correlation. We compute the trend rates rate of change as t = –(β/ψ) and 
test the null hypothesis of the rates being zero with a Wald test.
The table offers three important insights:11 First, arguably the most 
striking result is the early onset of price convergence in the fifteenth 
FiGure 2
LONG-RUN PRICE CONVERGENCE—COMPARISON:  
UNBALANCED VERSUS BALANCED SAMPLE
























































unbalanced sample balanced sample
Poly. (unbalanced sample) Poly. (balanced sample)
11 Note that trends are estimated separately for each period. The implication is that there are 
(minor) differences in the estimated initial CV and the implied level resulting from accounting for 
the absolute change over the preceding period. The resulting discontinuity gaps between the trend 
values at the end of one period and the start of the next period are, however, not nearly large enough 
to make a material difference to the periodization of price convergence and divergence. This is 
confirmed by two basic robustness checks. First, for each period, we considered the cumulated 
and implied yearly changes incorporating the fitted values after the break (e.g., 1452–1599 
instead of 1452–1598). While growth rates and absolute differences in the CV change, they are 
fully consistent with the initial periodization, that is, there is no change in direction. If anything, 
the results so derived strengthen the point made here, namely, that there was a significant fall in 
price dispersion up to the beginning of the seventeenth century and a stark increase during the 
half-century encompassing the Thirty Years War. Further, the results add support to the view that 
the first half of the nineteenth century, including the recovery from the effects of the Napoleonic 
Wars, was a period of marked convergence in prices. Second, we looked at the Hodrick–Prescott 
filtered series of the CV and measured rates of change over each of the Bai–Perron periods. The 
temporal pattern of increases and decreases in price dispersion, as documented in Table 2, is 
replicated. Details are available from the authors.
AU: Could we change to “Table 2 offers ...” ?

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century. By around 1600, price dispersion had already reached a level 
lower than in the early nineteenth century (fifth column in Table 2). Of 
course, such gains depended on time and place specific circumstances 
and indeed they were reversed in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
However, and this is our second point, this divergence had no lasting 
impact as convergence resumed after the end of the Thirty Years’ War. 
Thus, what Chilosi et al. (2013, p. 50) call “early roots” of integration, 
referring to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, was no 
more than an intermediate stage in a process that had begun at least 150 
years before the start date of their analysis. Third, the table confirms that 
the first half of the nineteenth century, after the end of the French wars, 
was an age of rapid price convergence. However, this was reversed after 
1870.
A glance at Figures 1 and 2 suggests that the story told by the evidence 
from the complete, unbalanced sample differs from what the long-run 
balanced sample shows. This may be due to either the changing composi-
tion of the unbalanced sample, or its broader geographical coverage, or 
both (Maps 1 and 2). How representative, then, is the smaller long-run 
balanced sample?
We address this question in two ways. First, we consider to what extent 
the long-run balanced sample is representative of the area it covers, that 
is, markets between Southern England and Northern Italy. To this end, 
we draw on subsets of the seven period-specific balanced samples, which 
include only markets situated within the minimum-length geographical 
table 2












1452–1913 –0.26*** 462 –70.19 0.56 –0.39
1452–1598 –0.18* 147 –23.14 0.49 –0.11
1599–1648  0.52* 50 29.23 0.26 0.08
1649–1798 –0.20*** 150 –26.06 0.41 –0.11
1799–1841 –1.87*** 43 –54.44 0.39 –0.21
1842–1874 –0.54 33 –15.98 0.12 –0.02
1875–1913  3.77*** 39 318.31 0.07 0.21
Wald test: 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: 
AU: Please add Source.

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perimeter of the long-run sample (Map 2), and then compare the trends 
in the respective coefficients of variation. Second, we gauge the extent to 
which the long-run balanced sample is representative of the entire conti-
nent by contrasting trends in price dispersion in the former with the corre-
sponding evidence extracted from the full set of period-specific balanced 
samples, which include markets from all over Europe (Table 1).
There are two alternative periodizations. The first is based on the 
80-year period-specific samples. The second uses the Bai–Perron break 
dates in the long-run balanced sample, which is compared to a composite 
(spliced) series of the period-specific balanced samples. While there is 
some change in the makeup of the composite series, there is a large degree 
of overlap in the composition of the period-specific samples incorporated 
(Table 1).
Table 3 reports the results. Comparison is facilitated by a Wald test of 
the null hypothesis of equal coefficients; “NR” indicates non-rejection 
of the hypothesis, implying that the rate of change of the coefficient of 
variation of the 80-year period-specific sample equals that of the long-run 
sample, and “R” that it is rejected.
The upper panel shows that the long-run balanced sample of 15 markets 
is representative of the rates of change in price dispersion pertaining 
to the much larger number of markets located within its geographical 
perimeter (Columns (1)–(3)). It also mirrors the direction of change apart 
from the periods 1450–1509 and 1581–1660. Using the same samples but 
Bai–Perron periodization (lower panel) confirms these findings. The only 
exceptions are the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, where 
the rates of change differ significantly but, crucially, not their direc-
tion—both samples show statistically significant divergence after 1874. 
Over the entire period 1452–1913, the composite series of period-specific 
samples within the perimeter replicates the behavior of the balanced 
long-run sample. In contrast, the results for the full (or “pan-European”) 
set of period-specific samples are markedly different from those for the 
balanced long-run sample (Columns (1), (4), and (5)).
These robustness checks suggest that the long-run balanced sample 
represents the patterns of price divergence and convergence in the area 
between Southern England and Northern Italy more accurately than those 
in the rest of the Continent. This warrants a closer look at the regional 
dimensions of integration. With the onset of the Little Divergence in about 
the early seventeenth century, the trajectories of the different European 
economies began to diverge markedly: Underpinned by their compara-
tively early development of modern institutions, England and the Dutch 
Republic expanded most rapidly and assumed economic leadership from 
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Northern Italy (Allen 2001; Fouquet and Broadberry 2015; de Pleijt and 
van Zanden 2016). To what extent did the Little Divergence coincide 
with more advanced market integration among the economic leaders?
We address the issue by defining six regional groups of markets broadly 
along polity boundaries as of 1649.12  The mid-seventeenth century has 
table 3
TRENDS IN THE COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION—COMPARISON  
OF LONG-RUN AND PERIOD-SPECIFIC BALANCED SAMPLES
Period Specific  
(Markets within  
Perimeter Only)
Period Specific  
(All Markets  
in Respective Samples)
Long-Run  
Balanced Rate  
of Change








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overlapping 80-year periodization: all samples balanced
1450–1509 0.35 –0.01 0.259 NR 0.101 0.352 NR
1508–1587 –0.03 –0.19 0.658 NR –0.30** 0.396 NR
1581–1660 –0.09 0.15 0.468 NR 0.06 0.615 NR
1644–1723 –0.06 –0.14 0.622 NR –0.36*** 0.043 R**
1706–1785 –0.23*** –0.26*** 0.851 NR –0.16 0.586 NR
1772–1851 –1.42*** –1.13*** 0.435 NR –0.53 0.032 R**
1834–1913 0.75* 0.43 0.739 NR 0.15 0.430 NR
Bai-Perron 
Breaks: Balanced Composite  Composite  
1452–1598 –0.18* 0.01 0.115 NR –0.18** 0.984 NR
1599–1648 0.52* 0.66* 0.775 NR 0.17 0.540 NR
1649–1798 –0.20*** –0.13*** 0.156 NR –0.21*** 0.967 NR
1799–1841 –1.87*** –1.70*** 0.705 NR –0.55 0.043 R**
1842–1874 –0.54 –1.56*** 0.080 R* –1.42*** 0.084 R*
1875–1913 3.77*** 2.19*** 0.019 R** 1.18*** 0.000 R***
1452–1913 –0.26*** –0.23*** 0.551 NR –0.18*** 0.049 R**
* = Significant at the 10 percent level.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
11430–1509
Source: 
12 Polity or state borders, rather than, for example, endogenously identified regional clusters, are 
chosen here for the match with common practice in the historiography. However, political borders 
changed significantly over the period and using present-day boundaries as a means to impose 
intertemporal consistency makes little historical sense.
AU: Please add Source.

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been chosen as it marks the center of the period studied; it also corre-
sponds well with the timing of the Little Divergence and the end of the 
Thirty Years’ War. The six “regions” are covered in both the long-run 
unbalanced sample and a balanced sample of 31 markets for 1508–1785 
and include Britain (England/Scotland, which for most of our period 
were politically integrated to a smaller or larger extent), France, the Holy 
Roman Empire north of the Alps (i.e., those of its territories subject to 
the Imperial constitution (cf. Schmidt 2011, p. 46)), Italy, which was, in 
Metternich’s words, a “geographical expression” rather than a political 
unit, the Dutch Republic, and the Iberian Peninsula (Map 3).13
The size of these regions differed and so did, ceteris paribus, average 
distance-related trade costs between markets in each area. Thus, levels 
Map 3
1508–1785 BALANCED SAMPLE: 31 MARKETS
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration; underlying map: Esri. “World Light Grey Base” [basemap]. 
Scale Not Given. January 31, 2015
13 In order to facilitate comparisons, the following discussion focuses on these six regions, 
though the more comprehensive unbalanced sample also includes markets from Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe, Scandinavia, and Switzerland.
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of integration and their changes over time have been measured by 
comparing actual gaps between all pairs of markets in each region with 
year-specific, distance-adjusted price gaps. First, we estimate the elas-
ticity of price gaps with respect to distance, as a proxy for trade costs, by 
running the regression for all pairs of markets i and j in year t:
abs(ln(Pit/Pjt)) = φt ln(distij). (4)
Second, as the coefficient is very volatile (because the cross section 
changes from year to year and there are strongly fluctuating prices), we 
smooth the yearly series of φ with an Epanechnikov kernel and then 
compute the expected price gap for each pair of markets, given their 
distance. Third, we average the differences between actual and expected 
price gaps for the markets of each region in year t and divide the result by 
the (smoothed) average of bilateral price gaps across European markets 
in the given year (minus one).14 There are two versions. Figure 3a uses 
as denominator all available market pairs in the long-run unbalanced 
sample, that is, it compares average distance-adjusted price gaps in the six 
regions with the average for the entire continent (cf. Map 1). Figure 3b, 
in contrast, draws only on price gaps between the markets in the balanced 
1508–1785 sample, that is, it compares price gaps in any of the six regions 
with the average across these regions that make up the sample area (cf. 
Map 3). In both cases, a ratio below zero implies that markets within a 
given region are better integrated than the relevant European average.
A first look at the evidence from the broader, Europe-wide unbalanced 
sample (Figure 3a) indicates strong regional deviations from the average 
European price gap. Markets in France, the Holy Roman Empire, and 
Italy appear distinctly less well integrated than the average, while price 
gaps in Britain were consistently smaller. The position of the Dutch 
Republic and Iberia changed over time. In this context, the evidence on 
the Northern Netherlands ties in well with the idea of a Little Divergence 
beginning in the seventeenth century. However, Britain enjoyed an inte-
gration advantage over the rest of the continent throughout the period.15
The comparison within the area covering only the six regions (Figure 
3b) shows that in the sixteenth century, English and Dutch markets were 
well integrated, but not exceptionally so. Price differentials between 
them were smaller than those between markets in France, Iberia, and 
14 The periodization corresponds with the Bai–Perron breakpoints estimated for the long-run 
balanced sample. 
15 This ties in well with Masschaele’s (1993) finding that transport costs were already low in 
medieval England.
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most clearly the Empire, but Italian markets were still roughly on a par. 
From the early seventeenth century onward, however, Britain and the 
Netherlands became truly exceptional. The Empire and Italy, by contrast, 
deteriorated progressively in relative terms. Taken together, these find-
ings lend considerable support to the claim that the Little Divergence 
began in the seventeenth century. The results for Iberia need to be taken 
with a pinch of salt: All three markets are on the coast, which made for 
comparatively easy communication between them.
While providing a comprehensive explanation of these findings is 
beyond the scope of this paper, offering a tentative hypothesis for future 
research is in order. Thus, the lack of internal custom borders, the easy 
access to water transport in most of the country, and the relative rarity 
of destructive warfare on the British Isles are likely to have contributed 
to the exceptionally rapid and far-reaching advance of price conver-
gence between markets in England. The Dutch Republic cannot but have 
benefited from easy access to internal water transport. The Empire, by 
contrast, was ravaged in the Thirty Years’ War, which, though being a 
Europe-wide conflict, was mainly fought on its territory. In addition, the 
war acted as an “institutional hothouse” (Ogilvie 1992/97): Governments 
attempted to cover the costs of warfare by selling regional monopoly 
rights that stayed in place long after the return of peace, tore apart existing 
trade links, and prevented the creation of new ones.
So far, the discussion of results has focused on price convergence as the 
first of two dimensions of market integration explored in this paper. Next, 
we turn to the second dimension, market efficiency, which we approxi-
mate by its outcome, that is, by the extent of co-movement in prices. The 
more efficient a market, the less likely are permanent equilibrium price 
differentials between different locations. 
Here, we draw on DFA, as set out above, to derive a sample-wide 
(synthetic) measure of “efficiency” (in the Empirical Strategy section). 
Running the DFA model over rolling windows, we settle for 51-year rolls 
for the balanced long-run and the first period-specific sample (15 and 
13 markets, respectively) and 25-year rolls for the other period-specific 
samples (between 32 and 116 markets).16 Each roll yields estimates of the 
16 The length of the period of each roll is determined by the need for a minimum number of total 
observations for a meaningful estimate. Given that the long-run sample includes only 15 markets 
(and the first period-specific sample only 13), as compared to the far larger number of markets 
included in the other period-specific samples, a longer run of 51 years gives a more appropriate 
number of observations. The use of rolls causes the loss of overlap between the different period-
specific samples, ruling out simple splicing or chain linking, hence the gaps. The DFA results for 
the period-specific samples have then been normalized on the long-run balanced sample on the 
basis of the first year in which they overlap. This is to avoid jumps in levels caused by changes in 
the composition of cities in the period-specific samples.
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common factors (ct) and of market loadings (λi)—and, thus, of τi and Ti. 
These parameters refer to all years of the roll. For instance, the earliest 
roll of the long-run sample is computed with the years 1450–1501, and it 
measures the efficiency in 1476, its 26th year.
Both series suggest that market efficiency, as approximated by 
co-movement, grew over the long term, though with distinct level differ-
ences between the long-run and period-specific samples (Figure 4). 
Comparing the measures for both samples suggests that, taken together, 
the 15 markets included in the long-run balanced sample were more effi-
cient for most of the period under review than the far larger number of 
markets in the period-specific samples. There are also some differences 
in the timing of short-run variations, but—and this is the main point—the 
trends suggest that the major phases of increase and decline in efficiency 
were fairly well aligned between the samples. Market efficiency started 
to improve slowly in the sixteenth century and, after a sharp reversal in 
the mid-eighteenth century, gains accelerated just before and after the 
French wars.17 Some of the potential causes of inter-temporal changes in 
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FiGure 4
EFFICIENCY MEASURES, BALANCED SAMPLES
Source: See the text.
17 These DFA-based findings are supported by correlation-based measures of co-movement as 
a robustness check. Details are available from the authors. 
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THE INTEGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET
Figure 5 compares the main findings on price convergence and effi-
ciency. The graph reproduces the DFA-based efficiency measure for the 
long-run sample from Figure 4. For ease of comparison, the series of the 
coefficient of variation (from Figure 2), expressed on a log scale, has 
been inverted and smoothed with a 51-year moving average.
In the long run, market integration improved along both its dimen-
sions: prices converged and co-movement increased (or markets became 
more efficient). However, the pattern of changes differed significantly 
between the two measures over extended periods, that is, between c. 1560 
and 1618, the years from about 1655 to the 1670s, and from the 1730s to 
the 1770s. It was only in the first half of the sixteenth century, the Thirty 
Years’ War period, and from about 1790 onward that price convergence 
and co-movement moved broadly in tandem.
Concerning co-movement, our findings differ markedly from Chilosi 
et al. (2013) whose focus on the shorter, post-1620 period does not 
allow identifying the long-term trend that becomes apparent when the 
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FiGure 5
PRICE-CONVERGENCE AND CO-MOVEMENT—BALANCED LONG-RUN SAMPLE
Source: See the text.
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increase in co-movement from about the 1770s in the context of French 
physiocratic policies that “lifted restrictions on the export of grains from 
localities” while at the same time pointing to “stationary trading costs 
in the second half of the 18th century” and lauding the “achievements of 
mercantilist policies of state formation” (Chilosi et al. 2013, p. 52). There 
are two problems with these claims. First, Turgot’s French physiocratic 
experiment of domestic grain market liberalization lasted less than two 
years (from September 1774 to May 1776; Jones 2003, pp. 296, 300; 
Persson 1999, pp. 5–6, 142–43). It would seem unlikely to have had a 
strong effect on Europe over the period 1770–1850. Second, there is no 
a priori reason why a rise in co-movement should be “difficult to recon-
cile” with either falling or stationary trade costs, as the authors seem to 
suggest.
Both price convergence and co-movement depend ultimately on trade 
costs. Trade costs “include all costs incurred in getting a good to a final 
user other than the marginal cost of producing the good itself: transpor-
tation costs (both freight costs and time costs), policy barriers (tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers), information costs, contract enforcement costs, 
costs associated with the use of different currencies, legal and regula-
tory costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail)” (Anderson 
and Wincoop 2004, p. 691 f.). Some changes in these costs affect both 
convergence and efficiency in the same way, while others have a differ-
ential impact.
Market integration would be enhanced by institutional change, which 
makes arbitrage between spatially distinct markets less costly (e.g., by 
increasing physical or legal security), by reduction of duties and by a 
decline in transportation costs (and vice versa). Such changes cause the 
commodity points to narrow and, ceteris paribus, foster convergence 
and reduce the scope for uncorrelated price movements. For instance, 
it is well known that the 1830s and 1840s featured wide-ranging liber-
alization of wheat imports in Europe—the abolition of the Corn Laws 
being the best-known instance (Federico 2012b). Until the 1870s, duties 
on wheat remained nil or negligible in all major European countries. In 
response to the “grain invasion” of Europe, most Continental countries 
started to protect wheat production from the late 1870s/early 1880s and 
increased duties in the 1890s. On the eve of the First World War, duties 
on wheat were about 30 percent in Italy, France, and Germany (Bacon and 
Schloemer 1940). Eight of the fifteen markets in our long-run balanced 
sample are located in these countries. The ratio between their average 
prices and those of the seven markets in free-trade countries (Belgium, 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) rose from 1.04 in 1874–1876 to 
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1.36 in 1911–1913. The cross-country component (reflecting interna-
tional trade) accounts for 97 percent of the increase in overall variance in 
the long-run sample.
Conventional wisdom holds that nineteenth-century progress in trans-
port technology—most notably the adoption of steam—helped integra-
tion (O’Rourke 1997; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007). However, our results 
suggest we should not overrate the effects of technical change in this 
period. For one thing, the beginning of the railway age in Europe coincided 
with the trend break that marks the end of significant price convergence 
(1842); for another, the fall in transport costs in the second half of the 
century was obviously insufficient to make up for the effects of the protec-
tionism that proliferated in Europe from the late 1870s onward. As for the 
preindustrial period, it is not clear to what extent changes in transport costs 
affected price convergence. The limited available evidence (Masschaele 
1993; Ballaux and Blonde 2018) seems to rule out any substantial decline 
in overland transport costs before the advent of systematic road building 
in eighteenth century England and France (Bogart 2005 and 2019) and 
early nineteenth century Germany (Uebele and Gallardo-Albarran 2015). 
Concerning sea transport, the jury is still out. British domestic freight 
costs, at least, fell sharply in the second half of the eighteenth century 
(Harley 1988). Menard (1991) argued that in the long term, freight rates 
were stable, whereas Van Zanden and Tielhof (2009) found an at least 
temporary decline in Baltic rates in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
Lucassen and Unger (2011) argue that labor productivity in shipping grew 
fast since the Middle Ages, which also points to a decline in freight costs.
Changes in other components of trade costs may affect price convergence 
and efficiency in different ways.18 Consider, for example, information, and 
here not only the costs, but also the kind of information acquired. If such 
costs decline and the information is about existing price differentials, the 
scope for arbitrage over space increases, resulting in both price conver-
gence between markets and stronger co-movement. If, however, informa-
tion costs decline and the information is about expected price changes, 
then the outcome is an increase in the scope for arbitrage over time: 
Merchants may, for example, react by stockpiling grain, expecting to sell 
it at a later date and for a higher price. Arbitrage over time, therefore, will 
affect co-movement but not necessarily price convergence. Importantly, 
if the speed of transmitting such information differs regionally—for 
example, access to relevant news improves everywhere but more quickly 
in some markets than in others—the result will be a decline in overall 
18 See Brunt and Cannon (2014) for a careful econometric analysis for England between 1770 
and 1820.
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co-movement. Relaxing institutional restrictions on stockpiling aimed at 
exploiting expected price changes (forestalling, in early modern parlance) 
earlier in some places than in others should have similar consequences.
These factors likely account for many of the ups and downs in co-move-
ment we observe before the 1770s. While the introduction of printing with 
movable types from the mid-fifteenth century made information more 
accessible, the importance of this innovation should not be overrated in the 
present context. After all, the new technology affected mainly the storage 
of information, rather than its transmission between markets (cf. Dudley 
1999, p. 601). Information transmission improved primarily through two 
channels: the emergence of postal systems from about 1500 and that of 
newspapers from c. 1600 onward. Older ways of transmitting informa-
tion had relied on sending irregular messengers who were often couriers 
in the literal sense of the word and, therefore, slow (Volckart 2007). 
Postal systems, by contrast, were characterized by regular links between 
markets, increasing speed, and reliability—three features that resulted 
from the creation of relay “posts,” where messengers could change horses, 
and from the opening of public messenger services to private consumers. 
The first such system was established between the Habsburg territories 
in the Netherlands, the Tyrol and Milan from 1490 onward, with private 
individuals being permitted to use the Imperial mail from 1516. While 
the postal network spread over the Holy Roman Empire, Habsburg, Italy, 
and Spain with a speed that historians have called a “communications 
revolution” (Behringer 2005, p. 43 f.; Behringer 2006, p. 121), France 
and England copied the system only from, respectively, 1603 and 1636 
onward (Morteveille 2009; Lewins 1865, p. 38 f.).19
The first modern newspaper—a weekly—appeared in Strasbourg in 1605 
(Weber 1992, 2005). By stimulating interest in political news, the Thirty 
Years’ War helped rather than hindered the spread of the new medium 
across the Empire, with the first daily paper appearing in its immediate 
aftermath in Leipzig. As Germany was politically decentralized, effec-
tive censorship was not feasible and almost any fact and opinion could be 
printed somewhere. The Empire was, therefore, a particularly propitious 
environment for the emergence of a wide reading public that enjoyed 
access to a variety of news from many places. By the end of the seven-
teenth century, about 200 different newspapers appeared in more than 70 
of its towns and cities (Schröder 1995, p. 6 f.). In England, the licensing act 
that restricted publications lapsed in 1694, and from then onward, news-
papers began to proliferate. The first daily appeared in London in 1702, 
19 For changes in postage costs in the eighteenth century, see Vinnal (2018). 
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and in the provinces, 22 papers were founded between 1714 and 1725 
alone. By 1780, there were 50 (Williams 2009, p. 49). Absolutist France, 
by contrast, had just one paper—the Gazette de France—that was allowed 
to publish political news, though between 1745 and 1785, the number of 
permitted foreign political papers increased from 5 to 19 (Censer 2002, 
pp. 8, 10). In short, the differential timing in the introduction of the new 
print medium across Europe is a likely part of the explanation as to why 
co-movement across European markets declined in the first half of the 
seventeenth century and increased thereafter up to the 1730s.
The ban on forestalling had restricted the ability of merchants to react 
to shocks that affected large numbers of markets simultaneously. Here, 
too, changes appeared in different regions at different times. Sreenivasan 
(2004, pp. 96, 271) has shown that whereas in South Germany tradi-
tional norms were still enforced in the fifteenth century, non-compliance 
spread and by the beginning of the seventeenth century the ancient ban 
on forestalling was a dead letter. In many English counties, by contrast, 
magistrates were still strictly enforcing such rules during the period of 
poor harvests in the mid-seventeenth century (Hindle 2008, pp. 74–76).
In sum, both the access of merchants to information and their freedom 
to respond to this information developed unevenly across space and 
time. Agents located in regions with no effective censorship, a variety 
of news channels, and institutions that imposed only weak restrictions 
on arbitrage over time were able to react quickly, while others were still 
lagging behind. It, thus, seems plausible that the observed decline in 
market efficiency in the middle decades of the eighteenth century was, to 
some extent, the result of the simultaneous spread of newspapers in the 
Holy Roman Empire and Great Britain and increasingly strict censorship 
in France during and after the Seven Years’ War (the number of royal 
censors grew from 79 in 1741 to nearly 200 in 1789; Jones 2003, p. 116). 
However, price convergence and the underlying arbitrage over space 
were affected by different factors that could be triggered by the same 
historical events or processes. Wars, for example, stimulated the interest 
in news that might concern the expected supply of grain, creating oppor-
tunities for arbitrage over time. On the other hand, it is highly likely that 
war disrupted trade networks and had harmful effects on price conver-
gence. Military operations, fear and uncertainty, and the requisitioning 
of draught animals were bound to disrupt commerce (Wilson 2010, p. 
800). In the seventeenth century, for example, armies needed about 10 
horses for every 15 soldiers (van Crefeld 2004, p. 24). At the height of 
the Thirty Years’ War in Germany in 1631/32, Wallenstein and Gustavus 
Adolphus fielded around 100,000 men each (Wilson 2010, p. 494). These 
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masses of troops would be accompanied by altogether at least 130,000 
horses. According to Sombart’s estimate (Sombart 1916/87, p. 341), just 
before the advent of the railway in the early nineteenth century, the entire 
transport sector of the German economy employed fewer than 40,000 
horses. Even considering that many more were used in agriculture (in 
about 1800, approximately 2.7 million; Bittermann 1956, p. 42 f.), and 
that water transport played a large role, military requisitioning must have 
had a severe impact on commerce. The available data are consistent with 
the view that wars played a role in shaping the European pattern of price 
convergence and divergence between the fifteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Drawing on Peter Brecke’s data set,20 we computed the annual 
number of armed conflicts fought on the European territories covered 
in the long-run balanced sample.21 Across Europe, the average number 
of conflicts declined over the long term, imperfectly mirroring the fall 
in average price differentials. Figure 6 shows a fairly close association 
20 Conflict catalog available at https://brecke.inta.gatech.edu/research/conflict/.
21 Note that we do not include wars fought by European countries outside of Europe; further, 
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FiGure 6
CONFLICTS AND CONVERGENCE
Sources: See the text. Data on conflicts from https://brecke.inta.gatech.edu/research/conflict/.
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between the frequency of warfare and the level of the coefficient of varia-
tion, drawing on 51-year moving averages as in Figure 5. Simply put, on 
average and over the long term, war was positively correlated with an 
increase in price dispersion.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines two dimensions of integration of the European 
market for wheat—the convergence in prices and the increase in effi-
ciency—over the period from the Black Death to the First World War. 
Geographically, this study covers most of Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Ural and from the White Sea to the Mediterranean. 
Our results are based on data far more comprehensive across time 
and space than those used in earlier analyses. They suggest a distinctly 
different picture of the long-run process of price convergence from 
that drawn in the recent historiography. Convergence started in the late 
fifteenth century, advanced rapidly until the beginning of the seventeenth 
century when it temporarily stalled, resumed after the Thirty Years’ War, 
and accelerated after the Napoleonic Wars in response to trade liberaliza-
tion. From the late 1840s, convergence petered out and turned into diver-
gence after 1875 as policy decisions dominated technological change. 
Thus, grain market integration in Europe was in the main a pre-industrial 
phenomenon.
The results of our regional analysis of price gaps lend support to the 
notion of the Little Divergence between a rapidly advancing Northwest 
and the rest of the Continent beginning in the seventeenth century. 
However, a qualifier is required here: England enjoyed a significant inte-
gration advantage over the other European economies from as early as 
the fourteenth century. In the sixteenth century, both English and Dutch 
markets were better integrated than their counterparts but not by a large 
margin. It was from the early seventeenth century onward that these two 
economies became exceptionally well integrated as especially the Holy 
Roman Empire at the other end of the spectrum, but also Italy, deterio-
rated progressively in relative terms.
Long-term improvements in market efficiency, as signaled by 
co-movement, began in the early sixteenth century, that is, a few decades 
later than the onset of long-run price convergence. There were some 
temporary setbacks, notably in the second half of the sixteenth and in the 
mid-eighteenth century. The patterns of price convergence and co-move-
ment overlap only weakly and in a few periods. This is likely the conse-
quence of uneven institutional change and the non-synchronous spread 
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of modern media and systems of information transmission that affected 
differentially the ability of merchants to react to news. Advances that 
were more rapid in some markets than in others would allow merchants 
in favored localities to react quickly, while others lagged behind. As a 
result, overall co-movement declined in such phases of development. 
It was only the comprehensive adoption of new media and information 
transmission systems as well as the eventual continent-wide erosion of 
traditional institutions restricting arbitrage over time in the late eighteenth 
century that initiated a period when price convergence and co-movement 
advanced in tandem.
These results have some implications for our interpretation of pre-
industrial economic history and, thus, for future research. First, the early 
modern period of European history emerges as the great age of commer-
cial intensification at the continent-wide level. The impact of industrial-
ization, railway construction, and trade liberalization in the nineteenth 
century was sizeable, but it cannot possibly explain the extent and 
temporal pattern of price convergence since 1450 observed here. Second, 
a fuller account of the regional dimensions of European market integra-
tion and the Little Divergence will have to address explicitly the causes of 
England’s exceptionalism in the late Middle Ages. Finally, price conver-
gence and improvements in market efficiency were frequently out of 
phase. We hypothesize that this had to do with differences in the timing 
and extent of changes in the costs of information relevant for arbitrage 
over space and the costs of information relevant for arbitrage over time. 
Testing this proposition empirically requires operationalizing transaction 
costs in a way that has rarely been attempted before (cf. Volckart 2007).
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